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Toaq has a | Toaq has a determiner, {{t|báq}}, which is used to talk about '''kinds''' of things, rather than some or all instances of them. | ||
For example, {{t| | For example, {{t|báq tuze}} means "soup" (or "soup-kind", or "soup in general") rather than {{t|sá tuze}} "some soup" or {{t|tú tuze}} "all soup". | ||
== Why have kinds? == | == Why have kinds? == | ||
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* "Dinosaurs are extinct" can not be expressed as <math>\left[\forall D\colon \text{Dinosaur}(D)\right] \text{Extinct}(D)</math>. Individual dinosaurs are not extinct, only dead. Dinosaurs, as a kind, are extinct. | * "Dinosaurs are extinct" can not be expressed as <math>\left[\forall D\colon \text{Dinosaur}(D)\right] \text{Extinct}(D)</math>. Individual dinosaurs are not extinct, only dead. Dinosaurs, as a kind, are extinct. | ||
* "Cats are widespread" can not be expressed as <math>\left[\exists C\colon \text{Cat}(C)\right] \text{Widespread}(C)</math>. Individual cats cannot be widespread. Not even "many cats are widespread". | * "Cats are widespread" can not be expressed as <math>\left[\exists C\colon \text{Cat}(C)\right] \text{Widespread}(C)</math>. Individual cats cannot be widespread. Not even "many cats are widespread". | ||
* Even "I'll make some soup" can not be expressed as <math>\left[\exists S\colon \text{Soup}(S)\right] \text{WillMake}(\text{I}, S)</math>. You aren't saying of some certain instance ''S'' of soup that you'll make it. Instead, the Toaq way of looking at this meaning of "make" is that we are "manifesting a kind"<ref name=manifesting-a-kind />. So we say {{t| | * Even "I'll make some soup" can not be expressed as <math>\left[\exists S\colon \text{Soup}(S)\right] \text{WillMake}(\text{I}, S)</math>. You aren't saying of some certain instance ''S'' of soup that you'll make it. Instead, the Toaq way of looking at this meaning of "make" is that we are "manifesting a kind"<ref name=manifesting-a-kind />. So we say {{t|baı jí báq tuze}}, and only the result of our efforts (if we succeed) is {{t|sá tuze}}. | ||
So, a language appears to need a way to make claims about kinds without quantifying over their individuals. One solution is to define predicates like "{{x}} makes something satisfying property {{x}}" and "The kind satisfying property {{x}} is extinct", and then fill them with {{t| | So, a language appears to need a way to make claims about kinds without quantifying over their individuals. One solution is to define predicates like "{{x}} makes something satisfying property {{x}}" and "The kind satisfying property {{x}} is extinct", and then fill them with {{t|lä tuze ja}}. (This is the approach taken by pre-kind Toaq {{t|lıbaı}}, or Lojban <code>jaukpa</code>.) But then we are really just tucking away the grammatical concept of kinds in those English definitions. Moreover, it is unnaturally indirect for "X makes Y" to be a <code>c 1</code> word when it very much feels like we are talking about ''things'' and not properties. | ||
== Semantics == | == Semantics == | ||
When we fill an argument place with a {{t| | When we fill an argument place with a {{t|báq}}-term, the logical meaning of the resulting claim depends on the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Predicate_(grammar)#Carlson_classes '''Carlson class'''] of the predicate with regards to that argument place. | ||
# '''Kind-level''' predicates, such as "{{x}} are extinct" and "{{x}} are widespread", just make a direct claim ''about'' the kind, rather than any individuals of it. They are usually nonsensical when filled with {{t| | # '''Kind-level''' predicates, such as "{{x}} are extinct" and "{{x}} are widespread", just make a direct claim ''about'' the kind, rather than any individuals of it. They are usually nonsensical when filled with {{t|sá}} or {{t|tú}} terms. | ||
# '''Individual-level''' predicates are true of their argument "no matter when": descriptions not tied to a timeline, like "{{x}} is/are intelligent". A {{t| | # '''Individual-level''' predicates are true of their argument "no matter when": descriptions not tied to a timeline, like "{{x}} is/are intelligent". A {{t|báq}} argument to such a predicate is interpreted as a general (but maybe not {{t|tú}}-universal?) claim over the individuals of the kind: "cats are intelligent", i.e. (pretty much?) any cat is intelligent. | ||
# '''Stage-level''' predicates are true only of their argument in their current temporal stage. A {{t| | # '''Stage-level''' predicates are true only of their argument in their current temporal stage. A {{t|báq}} argument to such a predicate is reduced to its {{t|sá}} equivalent: "cats are playing" means "some cats are playing". | ||
(These classes originated in linguistics to describe the apparent variety in meanings an indefinite noun phrase like "cats" can take on in different sentences. So in a sense, an easy way to think about {{t| | (These classes originated in linguistics to describe the apparent variety in meanings an indefinite noun phrase like "cats" can take on in different sentences. So in a sense, an easy way to think about {{t|báq kảto}} is to treat it the way you'd treat an indefinite noun phrase like "cats" in English.) | ||
== The typical… == | == The typical… == | ||
{{t| | {{t|báq}} does not mean "the typical X" (and never has).<ref name="not-typical" /> Typicality is orthogonal to {{t|báq}}:<ref name="orthogonal" /> you can call individual three-leaf clovers "typical", or say that {{t|báq}} clover rarely has four leaves. | ||
== External links == | == External links == | ||
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You can use the first to say the second one, but only indirectly: "This table is the result of me manifesting table kind" | You can use the first to say the second one, but only indirectly: "This table is the result of me manifesting table kind" | ||
</poem>}} | </poem>}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||