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User:Magnap/Inquisitive Semantics Proposal: Difference between revisions
User:Magnap/Inquisitive Semantics Proposal (view source)
Revision as of 15:13, 23 September 2024
, 23 SeptemberImprove the background by introducing the prerequisites
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==Background== | ==Background== | ||
This page assumes some background in classical first-order logic and possible-world semantics. If you know enough to get the gist of the basics of [[Semantics|Toaq semantics]], you should be good to go. If not, here's very briefly what you need to know: we can have a model of classical propositional logic where we represent each proposition by the set of "possible worlds" where it is true, where a "possible world" for this model is some object that completely determines the truth value of every proposition. Then, to judge truth, we distinguish a possible world that we call the real world, and say that a proposition is true if the set that represents it contains the real world. Then, we have ways to interpret <math>\lor</math>, <math>\neq</math>, and the other symbols of propositional logic as functions on sets, such that we can translate any statement in propositional logic to a set of possible worlds, in such a way that it "is true" (contains the real world) exactly when the statement is true. Oh, and this generalizes to classical first-order logic as well. Finally, if we have functions, we don't need to explicitly have sets as a "type of object": we can represent a set as a function that tells you whether some object is in the set or not, and you can "get the set back" by applying that function to everything and only keeping the things it returns true on. That way, you can choose to think of a proposition as either a set of possible worlds, or as a function from possible worlds to a truth value. | |||
In inquisitive semantics, rather than being subsets of all possible worlds (of type <math>\left\langle \text{s}, \text{t} \right\rangle</math>), propositions are taken to be nonempty ''sets'' of subsets of all possible worlds (of type <math>\left\langle \left\langle \text{s}, \text{t} \right\rangle, \text{t} \right\rangle</math>), downward closed under containment (meaning that, for some proposition <math>\text{P}</math>, if <math>\text{Q} \in \text{P}</math>, then for all <math>\text{R} \subseteq \text{Q}</math>, <math>\text{R} \in \text{P}</math>). In other words, they are specially-structured sets of what we are used to thinking of as propositions. On the basis of this idea of a proposition, a semantics for first-order logic can be built, that, if we take truth for a proposition <math>\text{P}</math> to be <math>\left\{\text{w}\right\} \in \text{P}</math>, is extensionally equivalent to classical [[predicate logic]]. | In inquisitive semantics, rather than being subsets of all possible worlds (of type <math>\left\langle \text{s}, \text{t} \right\rangle</math>), propositions are taken to be nonempty ''sets'' of subsets of all possible worlds (of type <math>\left\langle \left\langle \text{s}, \text{t} \right\rangle, \text{t} \right\rangle</math>), downward closed under containment (meaning that, for some proposition <math>\text{P}</math>, if <math>\text{Q} \in \text{P}</math>, then for all <math>\text{R} \subseteq \text{Q}</math>, <math>\text{R} \in \text{P}</math>). In other words, they are specially-structured sets of what we are used to thinking of as propositions. On the basis of this idea of a proposition, a semantics for first-order logic can be built, that, if we take truth for a proposition <math>\text{P}</math> to be <math>\left\{\text{w}\right\} \in \text{P}</math>, is extensionally equivalent to classical [[predicate logic]]. | ||