15
edits
Kind: Difference between revisions
Adding a section about formalization and theories. If some or all of its content is deemed too technical for the main article about Kinds, it could be moved into a different page.
m (→Semantics: Remove ◌̉ tone) |
(Adding a section about formalization and theories. If some or all of its content is deemed too technical for the main article about Kinds, it could be moved into a different page.) |
||
| Line 19: | Line 19: | ||
(These classes originated in linguistics to describe the apparent variety in meanings an indefinite noun phrase like "cats" can take on in different sentences. So in a sense, an easy way to think about {{t|báq kato}} is to treat it the way you'd treat an indefinite noun phrase like "cats" in English.) | (These classes originated in linguistics to describe the apparent variety in meanings an indefinite noun phrase like "cats" can take on in different sentences. So in a sense, an easy way to think about {{t|báq kato}} is to treat it the way you'd treat an indefinite noun phrase like "cats" in English.) | ||
== Formalization and theories == | |||
There remain some open questions on the exact working and formalization of ''báq'' and kind references. For example, does ''báq'' creates a logical scope, in such a way that changing its relative order of appearance with other quantifiers would yield different meanings? In e.g. ''“bu kaqgaı jí báq kato”'', is the sometimes purported equivalency of báq with sá in stage-level slots denied, as it would mean there is a specific cat which I am not seeing? What should ''“he leqfuo báq kato áq”'' mean? Are kinds a separate ontological type? | |||
One possible theory may be that the slot Carlson classes are a part of syntactic type of every predicates, and that ''báq'' expressions are expanded to different quantifier expressions depending on the Carlson class of the slot the expression goes in. This would open the possibility of ''báq'' expression having their own logical scope, for the better or the worse. This would also lend itself well to binding kind instances to anaphoric expressions, allowing ''“he leqfuo báq kato áq”'' to mean ''“cats lick themselves”''. | |||
Another possible theory may be that Carlson classes are mere lexicosemantic properties of predicates, so that syntax would not be aware of them, and that kind references would be intensional in nature, semantically homologuous to abstract properties referred to with ''cúaq'' expressions. Under such a model, predicates accepting ''báq'' complements would be provided with intensional arguments, and what is claimed about these intensions (e.g. making claims about intension themselves as with kind-level predicates, or making claims about instances as with stage-level predicates) would be fully up to the definition of the predicates themselves. This theory of intensionality would imply that ''báq'' expression would not create a scope interacting with that of other quantifiers, and would pretty much slip below the scope of any scope-creating elements, but it may implicate that expressing ''“cats lick themselves”'' is not as straightforwards as in alternative theories. It also opens issues of ontology, with respect to whether kind expressions belong to a separate type from that of concrete individual, and whether predicates accepting both kind and individual complements manifest type polymorphism or not, for example, whether ''“sá nuo”'' can either refer to a concrete individual or a kind, which could possibly cause unexpected issues with quantification. It might however be possible to have an ontological system by which the distinction between intensions (abstract properties) and extensions (concrete instances) is removed (by claiming that individuals are actually intensional properties with a single extension), which could possibly be helpful if mere type polymorphism is found to be source of semantic troubles. | |||
== The typical… == | == The typical… == | ||